PRACTICE STYLE AND SUCCESSFUL
LEGAL MOBILIZATION
ANNE BLOOM*
I
INTRODUCTION
What makes a great cause lawyer?1 Is it dedication to the cause?2 Strong ties
to a political movement?3 Or can someone with superb legal skills but no
political commitment be just as effective at advocating for a cause as a more
conventional cause lawyer, employed full-time on behalf of the cause? A
significant body of scholarship has explored these questions with mixed results.4
Perhaps not surprisingly, dedication, strong political ties, and superb legal skills
all play a role in the making of a great cause lawyer, but so does a somewhat
less obvious quality, which Marc Galanter described several years ago as
practice “style.”5
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1. Cause lawyers are activist lawyers who use their legal skills to advance a cause. See STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 170–
99 (1st ed. 1974) (providing an analysis of activist lawyers that would become the foundation of the
“cause lawyering” literature); Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the
Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
1998) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering] (“Cause lawyering . . . is frequently directed
at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and political status quo.”); Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the Possibilities of Cause Lawyering: An
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATES IN A GLOBAL ERA 3, 13 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation] (noting that cause
lawyers are those who “deploy their legal skills to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social,
economic, [or] legal values and resources.”). A cause lawyer is also generally a lawyer who elevates
cause over client, although sometimes the cause is the client herself. See generally Stuart Scheingold &
Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5
INT’L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 209 (1998) [hereinafter Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause
Lawyering] (describing a continuum of cause lawyers, including those for whom client empowerment is
the “cause”).
2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Towards an Understanding of the
Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 32 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
1998).
3. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION 61 (1994) (describing cause lawyer Winn Newman’s strong ties to the equal-pay
movement as critical to the movement’s success).
4. See, e.g., Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 4 (examining the conditions
that lead lawyers to engage in cause lawyering); Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation, supra note 1,
at 13 (observing that in practice, cause lawyering overlaps with conventional lawyering).
5. Marc Galanter, Mega-Law: An American Invention, 3 HUMAN. 16, 16 (1982) [hereinafter
Galanter, Mega-Law]; Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United
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An attorney’s practice style has to do with how she approaches legal
problems. Does she research the issue intensively before offering the client a
potential solution?6 Does she rely on specialists to understand issues with which
she is unfamiliar?7 Or does she adopt a less legalistic approach to the problem,
essentially doing the best she can under the circumstances, with relatively little
legal research or outside consultation?8 Galanter dubbed the former, more
research-intensive style of legal practice “mega-lawyering.”9 Lawyers who are
less legalistic, on the other hand—who, in Galanter’s words, undertake “more
perfunctory investigation[s]” and engage in “a fair amount of ‘winging it,’”—
were described as “ordinary” lawyers, employing an “ordinary” practice style.10
In the early 1980s, when Galanter first set out these distinctions, differences
among lawyers and the ways they practice law was understood primarily in
terms of differences in the types of clients different lawyers represent.11 Lawyers
in the upper stratosphere of legal practice represented corporate clients, while
lawyers in the lower stratosphere represented individuals.12 Then, as now, cause
lawyers did not fit easily into this division. This is because, as attorneys who
focus primarily on the “cause,” they challenge the dominant “ideology of
advocacy,” which trains lawyers to focus on their clients’ interests, while
remaining neutral to the cause.13
Because they tend to represent individual clients, cause lawyers seem to
have more in common with those operating in the lower sphere of legal
practice. Like those representing individual clients, for example, cause lawyers
tend to work with smaller budgets and offer a relatively narrow range of
services.14 But cause lawyers also have much in common with those representing
corporate clients. Like corporate lawyering, cause lawyering is associated with

States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 152, 153 (Robert
Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983) [hereinafter Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering].
6. See id. at 154 (describing the operating style of mega-lawyering as involving “more elaborate”
research and “painstaking” investigation, as compared to that of “ordinary lawyering,” which is typified
by “less elaborate” research and “more perfunctory” investigation).
7. See id. at 155 (describing the “high degree of specialisation” that is “cultivated” in megalawyering firms) and at 157 (noting that mega-lawyering usually involves “generous use of experts”).
8. See infra text accompanying note 10.
9. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 157.
10. Id. (citations omitted).
11. See id. at 152 (noting that most scholarship “conclude[s] that much of the variation within the
profession is accounted for by ‘one fundamental difference . . . the difference between lawyers who
represent large organizations [and] . . . those who represent individuals or individuals’ small
businesses.’”) (citations omitted); see also John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’
Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 770–74 (1998) (describing two distinct
“hemispheres” of lawyers representing corporate and individual clients).
12. Galanter, Mega-Law, supra note 5, at 16.
13. See Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 1, at 209 (noting that cause lawyers “challenge
mainstream representations of professionalism” by “taking sides in social conflicts”); William Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36
(describing the neutrality principle as one of the bedrocks of the “ideology of advocacy”).
14. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 154.
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relatively high levels of prestige.15 Moreover, much like corporate lawyers, cause
lawyers essentially have a “repeat player”—the cause—for a client, with the
corresponding advantages of the “repeat player” status.16
Galanter’s emphasis on the importance of practice style helps us better
understand some important similarities between the professional experiences of
cause lawyers and corporate lawyers, even when they represent very different
types of clients. But Galanter’s fundamental point was much more profound.
More focus on practice style, he argued, would shed light on how changes in
practice style were marking an important “shift” in American legal practice,
with implications not only for lawyers and their clients, but also for the “larger
economic and political order.”17
Although Galanter acknowledged, at that time, that mega-lawyering was
associated primarily with lawyers in corporate practice, he argued convincingly
that the mega-lawyering style was being adopted by many practicing outside the
realm of the corporate law firm.18 Perhaps more important, the mega-lawyering
style was also gaining cultural dominance within the profession as a particularly
prestigious (and lucrative) style of practice.19 In his words, mega-lawyering was
becoming “an increasingly visible and influential part of the whole.” 20
Some twenty-five years later, Galanter’s insights seem remarkably prescient.
Mega-lawyering now describes the practice style of large segments of the bar,
including many cause lawyers.21 Moreover, there is now a significant literature
on the economic, social, and political forces behind this fundamental shift in

15. This greater prestige stems from the role that cause lawyering is perceived to play in providing
legitimacy for the legal system and for the profession as a whole by representing interests that might
otherwise go unrepresented. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law:
Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 407, 459 (1994) (discussing the public-interest lawyer). As Sarat and Scheingold have
noted, the legal profession “need[s] lawyers who commit themselves and their legal skills to furthering
a vision of the good society because this ‘moral activism’ puts a human face on lawyering.” Sarat &
Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 3. In exchange for this service, legal elites tend to view
the cause lawyer in a more favorable light than they view other lawyers who practice outside the upper
hemisphere.
16. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 140–44 (1974).
17. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 153. This “shift,” Galanter argued,
was “comparable to the movement from the individual general practitioner to hospital medicine.” Id.
18. See id. at 154–55, 170 (discussing the expansion of mega-lawyering outside the corporate firm),
at 167–68 (describing the adoption of a mega-lawyering style by corporate in-house counsel, religious
cults, the Defender Association of Philadelphia, and Team Defense, Inc., a nonprofit representing poor
defendants).
19. See id. at 158 (noting the greater prestige associated with mega-lawyering).
20. Id. at 172.
21. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of
Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1785–95 (2002)
(describing the rise of “heavy hitters” (mega-lawyers) in the plaintiff’s bar and distinguishing them
from those with a more ordinary or “bread and butter” practice); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING
REFORM SERIOUSLY 170 (1986) (describing the increasingly elite focus of the public-interest (or causelawyering) bar).
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legal practice.22 Relatively less attention, however, has been paid to
understanding the political implications of this development. And, yet,
according to Galanter, it is the political implications of mega-lawyering that
should concern us most.
Galanter has not (yet) written all that much on the implications of the rise of
mega-lawyering. As of this writing, there are only two articles, totaling under
thirty pages.23 The focus of these articles is to describe mega-lawyering as an
innovation in legal practice. But both articles also close with a dark conclusion:
“Mega-law heightens our expectations of legal vindication,” even as it “teaches
us to despair of their realization.”24
Legal vindication is the coin of the realm for all lawyers, of course, but it is
especially so for cause lawyers, who play a uniquely important role in shoring
up the legitimacy of the legal system.25 If mega-lawyering “teaches us to
despair” of legal vindication, does this mean cause lawyers who adopt a megalawyering style are less effective politically? It is not a question Galanter has
explored. But Galanter’s articles on mega-lawyering do provide important
conceptual tools that may be used to evaluate how practice style affects the
efficacy of cause lawyers.
What follows is both a fuller explication of those tools and a more grounded
exploration of how differences in practice style affected the outcomes in two
cases. Part II provides some background on why the practice styles of cause
lawyers may matter for purposes of successful legal mobilization. Part III
analyzes how the practice styles of cause lawyers in two strikingly similar cases
may have been a factor in the very different outcomes that the cases achieved.
Part IV speculates about how practice style may affect the possibilities for
successful legal mobilization more broadly.

22. Virtually all of this literature focuses on the plaintiff’s bar. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra
note 21, at 1795–1808 (describing changes in the market and legal environments for Texas plaintiffs’
lawyers); Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases:
Stratification in the Plaintiff’s Bar in the 21st Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 228 (1997) (noting the
“growth of bureaucratic structures” in the plaintiff’s bar), at 231 (noting the large size, geographical
reach, and “extensive resources” at the “top” of the plaintiff’s bar); Jerry Van Hoy, Markets and
Contingency: How Client Markets Influence the Work of Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Lawyers, 6 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 345, 345–46 (1999) (similar findings in Indiana); cf. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS 44–47 (1989) (examining the rise of professionalism, a related development).
23. Galanter, Mega-Law, supra note 5 (two pages); Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering,
supra note 5 (twenty-one pages). Galanter has also written related articles about the growth of large
law firms. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-toPartner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747 (1990).
24. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 173; Galanter, Mega-Law, supra
note 5, at 16.
25. Sarat & Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 3 (contending that cause lawyers take
responsibility for the positions they represent and thus “elevate[] the moral posture of the legal
profession beyond a crude instrumentalism in which lawyers sell their services without regard to the
ends to which those services are put”).
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II
CAUSE LAWYERING AND PRACTICE STYLE
Cause lawyers are activist lawyers who use their legal skills to advance a
cause.26 Although the prototypical cause lawyer works for organizations like the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) or the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),27 a great deal of cause lawyering is
also engaged in by lawyers in private practice.28 Moreover, in practice,
“[i]ndividual lawyers frequently cross and recross the lines between cause and
conventional legal practice.”29 In other words, lawyers sometimes act as cause
lawyers in a particular case, only to return to more conventional representation
in a different case.
Cause lawyers often engage in as much activism as lawyering.30 Indeed, their
success often depends on their ability to subordinate legal strategies to the
broader aims of the political movement.31 Thus, the most effective cause lawyers
spend some energy coordinating litigation with publicity campaigns so that the
litigation can act as a tool for raising consciousness.32 Cause lawyers can also
encourage more direct activism, such as “rallies, marches, and other efforts”
aimed at displaying support for the broader cause.33
Although cause lawyers share an interest in using the law as a tool for social
change, cause lawyering is not associated with a particular practice style. In
part, this is because cause lawyers are found in all kinds of practice settings.34
When cause lawyers work for nonprofit organizations like the ACLU and the
NAACP, their style of practice tends to more closely resemble the megalawyering style of lawyers in corporate practice. Perhaps because of this,
Galanter describes the legal style of cause lawyers as “an approximation of
mega-law[yering] with less ample funding.”35 When cause lawyering is engaged

26. See discussion supra note 1.
27. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 173.
28. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 210 (describing a
study of cause lawyering in different practice settings, including private practice); Sarat & Scheingold,
Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing cause lawyers in private practice).
29. Sarat & Scheingold, State Transformation, supra note 1, at 13.
30. See, e.g., MCCANN, supra note 3, at 61 (recounting a cause lawyer’s efforts to educate the
public about the cause for which he was litigating); see also Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause
Lawyering, supra note 1, at 236 (describing the activism of a union lawyer).
31. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 203–19 (arguing that legal tactics must be subordinate to a
broader strategy of political mobilization to succeed).
32. See, e.g., MCCANN, supra note 3, at 58–63 (discussing the impact of media coverage on legal
mobilization in the equal-pay movement).
33. See id. at 81.
34. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 210 (noting that
cause lawyering takes place in corporate, salaried, and small-firm practices).
35. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 171.
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in by smaller-firm lawyers who represent individual clients, however, their
practice style may more closely resemble that of “ordinary” lawyers.36
There is also some evidence that lawyers in different practices approach
their cause-lawyering activities differently. Corporate lawyers, for example, are
less likely to engage in political activities such as organizing protests or publicity
campaigns around the broader issues at stake.37 In contrast, small-firm lawyers
who routinely represent individual clients tend to exhibit greater willingness to
engage in overtly political tactics.38 Because of this, some studies suggest that
the type of client a lawyer usually represents (corporate versus individual)
reveals much about how the lawyer will approach her cause-lawyering
activities.39
Galanter suggests, however, that differences in how lawyers approach cause
lawyering may have less to do with the type of client a lawyer normally
represents and more with practice style. This is because even those lawyers who
do not engage in cause lawyering full-time are likely to use the same practice
style in cause lawyering as they do in their everyday legal activities. In other
words, while lawyers move in and out of cause-lawyering activities,40 it is
unlikely that they change practice styles when doing so. A lawyer who employs
a mega-lawyering practice style is likely to operate as a mega-lawyer in all cases,
regardless of the type of client she represents.
The growing dominance of mega-lawyering, however, poses its own set of
challenges to cause lawyering. This is because the increasing visibility and
influence of mega-lawyering, both within and without the cause-lawyering
enterprise, may undermine our faith in the legitimacy of the legal system.41 As
Galanter has documented extensively, criticism of lawyers—and of the legal
system—has been growing in the last few decades.42 Galanter traced these
increasingly negative perceptions of the legal profession directly to the growth
of mega-lawyering.43

36. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 229–44 (describing
the challenges associated with cause lawyering in salaried and small-firm practice settings, in terms
characteristic of an “ordinary” practice style).
37. See id. at 220–29, 245 (observing that pressure on billable hours and conflict-of-interest rules
impose some restrictions on corporate lawyers’ ability to engage in cause lawyering).
38. See id. at 236–44 (observing that small-firm lawyers tend to be described as political activists).
39. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 210 (describing the
study’s conclusion that “professionally transgressive”—overtly political lawyering—“can be traced
to . . . the conditions at the [corporate, salaried, or small firm] practice site”).
40. See supra text accompanying note 29.
41. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 173 (associating megalawyering with “disenchantment” and perceptions that the legal system is “manipulable and political”).
42. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes,
and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 814–15 (1998) (noting that lawyers are no longer
portrayed in fiction and on television as “unalloyed hero[es]” but instead occupy a “morally ambiguous
and precarious role”).
43. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 173 (arguing that megalawyering has been stereotyped and that mega-law is “intimately connected with a dual movement of
legislation and disenchantment”).
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The world of mega-lawyering is a world of “bargaining, deals and
settlements,” where law is both “omnipresent” and “indeterminate.”44 It is also
a world where lawyers who know how to play the game well, and where socalled “repeat players,” enjoy significant advantages.45 Under these
circumstances, many Americans understandably believe lawyers have
“unwarranted and unaccountable power in American society.” 46
Put differently, the work of legal practitioners has become associated more
with the manipulation of legal outcomes than with obtaining justice.47 Somewhat
perversely, this is partly because mega-lawyering generates more opportunities
for legal engagement. As more people invoke the law, Galanter argues, a sense
that the law is “manipulable and political” becomes more widespread.48 It is this
“catch-22” that led Galanter to conclude that mega-lawyering ultimately
teaches us to feel “despair” about the possibilities for “legal vindication.”49
Such despair is particularly problematic for cause lawyers, because they
draw upon the perceived legitimacy of the law to advance the aims of their
cause.50 As Scheingold argued in The Politics of Rights, “[i]nsofar as court
decisions can legitimate claims and cue expectations,” the law can successfully
contribute to political mobilization.51 Thus, when the legitimacy of the law is
threatened, so is the political efficacy of cause lawyering.
But is the picture really all that gloomy? As even Galanter notes, megalawyering also creates important new opportunities for cause lawyers to reorganize their efforts in ways that may increase their legal and political
efficacy.52 From this point of view, mega-lawyering may pose no greater
problems for the cause-lawyering enterprise than ordinary lawyering, which
faces its own set of challenges.53 Is mega-lawyering really any more antithetical
44. Id.
45. See id. at 172 (noting that the legal system in the United States “amplifies the powers of
competent players of the law game, accentuating the advantages of those able to invest in continuous
service, advance planning, long term strategy and large maneuvers”).
46. Id.
47. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 172 (arguing that the American
legal profession is a game that amplifies rewards to those—usually corporations—able to invest in longrange planning while withholding such benefits from individuals).
48. Id. at 173.
49. Id.
50. See generally SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 131–32, 162–63 (arguing that legal culture and
rights help determine when people decide to turn to the government).
51. Id. at 132. Many subsequent studies have confirmed Scheingold’s claim. See, e.g., SUSAN M.
OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984) (the role of
law in the disability-rights movement); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING
AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996) (analyzing the role of law in the animal-rights
movement); Neal Milner, The Dilemmas of Legal Mobilization: Ideologies and Strategies of Mental
Patient Liberation, 8 LAW & POL’Y 105 (1986) (the role of law in mental-health activism).
52. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 170 (discussing attempts to put
mega-law at the service of public interest and how mega-law creates long-run legal strategies for the
new clientele).
53. See Scheingold & Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering, supra note 1, at 236–44 (noting the
challenges associated with cause lawyering in small-firm practice—a type of legal representation
commonly associated with “ordinary” lawyering).
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to justice than ordinary lawyering? And if so, is there something about ordinary
lawyering that makes it better? One way to answer these questions is to
compare the practice styles of those who lawyer for a cause.
III
TWO CASE STUDIES
Over the last several decades, there has been a steady increase in attempts
by foreign workers employed outside the United States by U.S.-based
multinational employers to sue their employers in U.S. courts.54 These cases are
politically significant because in each of the lawsuits filed, the foreign workers
asserted that they had both the right to sue in the United States and the right to
the same or similar employment-related protections as workers in the United
States. Thus, the lawsuits presented an important opportunity for political
mobilization around the issue of workers’ rights in the global economy.55
Two of those cases are described below, with an emphasis on the
background and practice style of the lawyers representing the workers.
Although there are important differences in the way the cases were litigated,
the legal and political challenges raised by the two cases were nearly identical.
The lawsuits were brought in the state courts of the same state, at
approximately the same time. And they raised the same legal issue: whether
U.S. courts could or should hear the claims of foreign workers injured outside
the United States.
The workers in both cases were also represented by lawyers who, at least
superficially, were more similar than different. In both instances, the litigation
was handled by personal-injury lawyers who viewed the cases as opportunities
to use the law as a tool for advancing a broader cause. However, the lawyers
approached the litigation with different practice styles. In one case, the lawyers
representing the workers had adopted a mega-lawyering practice style relatively
recently. In the other, the lawyers employed more of an “ordinary” practice
style.
The cases illustrate how lawyers for a cause may adopt different practice
styles, even when they are litigating very similar cases. The cases also show how
differences in practice style may have some effect on the possibilities for
54. See Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?—The Emergence of Retaliatory
Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 183–85 (2001) (discussing failed attempts by Indian and
Caribbean workers to bring actions against American multinational corporations in U.S. courts);
Malcom J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy:
Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and
Aguinda, 36 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 299, 300 (2001) (noting that in recent years, plaintiffs from poor nations
have attempted to bring class-action lawsuits in U.S. courts against transnational corporations).
55. In other areas of activism, such as the human-rights and environmental movements, litigation
has played an important role in the development of transnational networks. See MARGARET E. KECK
& KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 24–25 (1998) (observing that diffuse interests have been permitted representation in
American courts and that this explains why so many American advocacy groups devote substantial
resources to litigation).
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political mobilization in conjunction with the legal strategy. If these cases are
any indication, cause lawyers who employ an “ordinary” practice style may be
more, or at least equally, effective advocates for workers’ rights than “megalawyers,” at least in the global or transnational context.
A. The Stories
Chavez v. Global Chemical Company56 was brought on behalf of several
dozen Central American farmworkers who alleged that they had been left
sterile by their workplace exposure to pesticides in Central America. The
pesticides had been banned in the United States after farmworkers working in
the United States complained of similar injuries. After winning a precedentsetting ruling, which established the right of the workers to sue in the United
States, the workers settled for an undisclosed amount said to be in the range of
tens of millions of dollars.
The case was handled by Allen & Adams, one of the nation’s largest and
most successful personal-injury firms, with over seventy-five lawyers, a staff
numbering in the hundreds, and offices in seven states. Both the size of the firm
and the expansive geographic reach of its operations are consistent with a
“mega-lawyering” style of practice.57 Like other firms operating with a megalawyering style, Allen & Adams’s recruiting practices have become increasingly
elite as it grew in size.58 Once comprised primarily of lawyers from local law
schools, today the firm recruits from the most competitive law schools in the
country.
Although primarily oriented toward litigation for profit, Allen & Adams has
a history of handling and funding cause litigation. Rick Allen, the founding and
dominant shareholder of the firm, worked for a well-known political activist
and philanthropist in his early years as a lawyer. Since opening his practice, he
has provided substantial financial support to a variety of public-interest legal
organizations. Allen has also served on the board of a number of activist
groups.
Firm insiders cite a variety of reasons for Allen & Adams’s taking the
Chavez case, including that they thought it might be “a huge money-maker”
and that it sounded “interesting and exotic.”59 At the same time, the firm also
maintains that it brought the case because “it sounded like a case that really
needed to be brought whether or not it was going to make any money.”60

56. Although the stories presented here are based on real cases, the dates, names, locations, and
identifying details have been changed to protect the privacy of the parties involved. The information
provided here was gathered from a variety of sources, including interviews with the lawyers, court files,
media reports, and correspondence about the litigation, all of which is on file with the author.
57. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 154.
58. Id. at 158 (noting that “[m]ega-law draws recruits from higher social strata, from higher status
ethnic groups, and from elite educational institutions”).
59. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 22, 2000).
60. Id.
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After an initial investigation, Allen & Adams assigned primary
responsibility for the case to Richard Wheeler, a first-year associate with almost
no litigation experience. Prior to joining the firm, Wheeler had been a highly
sought-after, top-ranked student at an elite law school. His initial involvement
with the case had been as a summer associate and, though the opportunity to
work more on the case was not a primary consideration in his decision to join
the firm, he actively sought to be involved in the case after he became an
associate.
Wheeler said he was initially intrigued by the case because of the intellectual
challenge it offered. As he explained, “[e]ven then, as a first-year lawyer, I
could tell . . . [it was] cutting-edge stuff and interesting.”61 Wheeler also liked
working on the case because of what he called the “political dimension” of the
litigation.62
The first challenge that Wheeler and his firm faced was to find a U.S. court
that would agree to hear the lawsuit. Drawing upon its extensive resources
around the country, Allen & Adams engaged in a strategy often referred to as
“forum shopping.”63 The strategy entailed separating the workers into several
different groups and bringing lawsuits on behalf of the different groups in
different courts, the idea being that all the cases would be joined together once
they found a court that agreed to hear the case. After two unsuccessful attempts
to bring the lawsuit in two other states, Allen & Adams convinced a court to
hear the case.
The lawsuit named Global Chemical Company, as well as a large oil
company, Universal Oil Corporation, as defendants. Although neither company
had been involved in employing the workers, nor in exposing them to the
chemical, both had been involved in the chemical’s manufacturing process and
had allegedly agreed to its shipment for use overseas. The farmworkers’
employer was left out of the lawsuit. Ostensibly, this was because the workers
feared that, if named as a defendant, the employer would retaliate against
family members and workers who still worked on the plantation. It is likely,
however, that legal strategy (that is, jurisdictional) considerations also played a
part in this decision.
Somewhat to the firm’s surprise, the case turned out to be extremely
expensive to litigate. In addition to the trips to the workers’ home country, the
firm had to pay for various experts on foreign law, plus the usual experts
needed to prove the workers’ claims. In retrospect, it is also likely that Allen &
Adams underestimated the legal challenges the case presented. As Wheeler
explained, until they were in the middle of it, “[we] never imagined the
procedural quagmire that it would become.”64
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82–83 (1979)
(describing forum shopping’s place in the American legal system).
64. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 22, 2000).
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The firm’s leadership was well aware, however, of the political dimensions
of the lawsuit. This awareness was facilitated in part by the legal support
provided to the defendants by other corporations. Despite this recognition, the
firm made virtually no attempt to generate support for their clients’ position
among local activists or among others in the personal-injury bar who might
have had a pecuniary interest in a ruling establishing the right of foreign
workers to sue in the United States. When asked why this was so, Wheeler said
that it did not “really click[] in his mind” to seek political support for his
clients.65
Wheeler also did not attempt to frame his arguments in a way that
acknowledged the political dimensions of the case. Instead, his focus remained
highly legalistic, even after the litigation became a subject of debate in the local
legislature. To the surprise of many, the firm shunned its traditional allies in
these legislative debates and agreed to engage in secret, closed-door
negotiations that ultimately resulted in the legislative reversal of the workers’
legal victory.
The second case, Espinoza v. Montego, was brought in the same state on
behalf of the family of a foreign worker who was murdered while delivering
payroll for a U.S. multinational corporation. The lawsuit focused on the
company’s refusal to provide the worker with an armored truck, even though
the roads in the area were known to be dangerous and frequented by thieves.
After six days of trial, the employer agreed to an extraordinary settlement that
included building a monument to workers’ rights and that paid more than $1
million in damages.
The Espinoza family was represented by the southwestern firm of Barrow &
Burns. Brad Barrow, the lead partner of the firm, is a left-wing general
practitioner who, prior to litigating the Espinoza case, had served on the local
city council. Barrow’s partner, Mike Burns, is a self-described “hell-raiser” who
speaks Spanish fluently and has traveled extensively outside the United States.
Like Barrow, his politics are decidedly left of center.66
At the time it litigated the Espinoza lawsuit, Barrow & Burns was typical of
a law firm adopting an “ordinary” practice style. It had only a handful of
lawyers and a relatively small support staff.67 Although well-regarded in their
local community, the firm was relatively unknown elsewhere and had relatively
little experience with major litigation.68 Its caseload included a variety of
litigation matters, including personal-injury claims and commercial cases drawn
almost exclusively from the local community.
Both Barrow and Burns knew from the outset that the Espinoza case would
be extremely difficult to litigate. Nevertheless, they were attracted to the
65. Id.
66. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998).
67. See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 154 (noting that firms with an
“ordinary” practice style tend to run on smaller organizational units).
68. See id. (associating “ordinary” lawyering with smaller cases and a “local” scope of operations).
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litigation by the broader political issues at stake. As Burns put it, “this was the
kind of case that I had gone to law school for.”69
Knowing that they faced an uphill battle to even get the case to trial, Barrow
& Burns recruited a nationally recognized legal expert, who usually represented
corporate defendants, to handle the legal arguments. The expert’s arguments
featured long lectures on the history and case law of technical legal issues,
reflecting extensive research. In short, unlike Barrow & Burns, the legal expert
they recruited operated with a “mega-lawyering” practice style.70
Barrow & Burns, meanwhile, spent significant energy getting to know their
clients—the family of the murdered worker—and understanding what they
hoped to achieve with the litigation. During the course of the lawsuit, Barrow &
Burns developed a deep emotional connection with the family. During
interviews with the lawyers several years after the case was litigated, they
showed a video that featured photos of the worker before her murder and cried
when talking about the case.71
Barrow & Burns also worked to obtain political support for the lawsuit from
activists in the United States. To some extent, this was a matter of simply calling
upon old friends. Despite their extensive personal contacts, however, they did
not take this support for granted. To convince activists to become involved,
Barrow & Burns wrote lengthy letters to several activist organizations, urging
them to get involved in the case. In most instances, it was this contact that
pushed the activists to become involved.
Once activists agreed to support the case, Barrow & Burns also gave them
substantive roles in the litigation. One activist, for example, helped to recruit
and prepare witnesses for trial. Others tracked media coverage and kept
copious notes during the trial. As a measure of how much Barrow & Burns
valued this input, both attorneys later described the activists’ support as
“absolutely critical” to the success of the case.72
This broader, more political perspective on the case also influenced Barrow
& Burns’s strategy at trial, where Barrow placed great emphasis on the broader
issue of the working conditions of workers overseas. During his questioning of
the defendants, for example, Barrow repeatedly asked whether the defendants
valued the lives of their workers in the United States more than the lives of
other workers. He also questioned them about their refusal to raise wages,
despite strikes and walkouts for higher wages.
After six days of trial, the defendants approached Barrow & Burns and
asked them what it would take to settle. Barrow & Burns described the
subsequent negotiations as an “extraordinary experience,” in which the

69.
70.
71.
72.

Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998).
See infra text accompanying note 74.
Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998).
Id.
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defendants readily agreed to virtually all of their terms, including building a
monument to the slain worker.73
B. “Mega-lawyering” v. “Ordinary” Lawyering
In some respects, the experiences of the workers’ lawyers in these two cases
were quite similar. For each of the lawyers, the litigation represented an
important moment in their careers when they were motivated by the
opportunity the litigation presented to engage in cutting-edge, challenging, and
politically significant legal work. Thus, each clearly understood that taking on
the cases involved lawyering for a cause. At the same time, however, the
lawyers employed very different practice styles.
Richard Wheeler of Allen & Adams approached the Chavez case with a
style of practice that most closely resembles mega-lawyering. “Megalawyering,” recall, features intense specialization and coordination. In contrast
to “ordinary” lawyering, it involves “meticulous and exhaustive research,
painstaking assembly of data, and generous use of experts.”74 As a large law
firm, Allen & Adams employs these techniques in their everyday cases. Not
surprisingly, Wheeler and the firm employed a similar approach in the course of
litigating the Chavez case. From Allen & Adams’s own reports and from
reviewing the pleadings filed in the lawsuit, it is clear that the firm expended a
great deal of energy on legal research and factual investigation. It also spent a
great deal of money on experts for the case. These features characterize the
practice style as mega-lawyering in the cause-lawyering context.
At first glance, this characterization of Wheeler’s practice style may seem
somewhat unexpected. Allen & Adams is a personal-injury law firm, and most
personal-injury law firms are small firms, associated with an ordinary practice
style that places less emphasis on legal research and investigation.75 On the
other hand, with more than seventy-five lawyers and recruiting practices that
favor making new hires from only the top ranks of highly rated law schools,
Allen & Adams looks and operates much like an elite firm in corporate
practice.76 Under these circumstances, it makes sense that their lawyers would
approach litigation with a mega-lawyering style.
In contrast, Barrow & Burns, the lead lawyers for the Espinoza family,
exhibited a practice style that more closely resembles “ordinary” lawyering,
which “involves little consultation or legal learning, more perfunctory
investigation and a fair amount of ‘winging it.’”77 Barrow & Burns were smallfirm lawyers who paid relatively little attention to the legal research that the
case required. Instead, they hired someone else—a corporate defense lawyer
with highly specialized legal expertise—to research and argue the key legal
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 157.
See supra text accompanying note 10.
See supra text accompanying note 58.
See Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering, supra note 5, at 157.
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issues for them. And, unlike Allen & Adams, Barrow & Burns relied on
assistance from the activist community in identifying and preparing their expert
witnesses. In short, Barrow & Burns’s style of practice represents the antithesis
of the mega-lawyering approach, if not a pure embrace of the “ordinary”
lawyering style of “winging it.”
Barrow & Burns also engaged more with local activists throughout the
litigation and otherwise capitalized on the political opportunities the litigation
presented. More so than Allen & Adams, Barrow & Burns encouraged activist
involvement and worked with activists throughout the litigation to maximize
the political impact of the case. This was done in part by framing their legal
arguments in terms of the broader issue of workers’ rights and by structuring
the settlement along lines that recognized the broader cause at stake. The
mega-lawyering practitioners at Allen & Adams, in contrast, made virtually no
effort to either notify activists of the litigation or involve them in litigation
strategy.
Is the Espinoza case an anomaly, or are there reasons why lawyers with an
ordinary practice style might be more effective at identifying and capitalizing on
the political opportunities in this type of litigation? One possibility is that the
relatively less legalistic approach of the ordinary practice style may allow
lawyers to take a more pragmatic and, ultimately, more political approach to
framing the arguments in the case. During the Espinoza trial, for example,
Barrow & Burns made multiple arguments about the low wages and poor
working conditions of other foreign workers. From a legal standpoint, these
issues had no place in the litigation because general working conditions were
not on trial. But from a political perspective, it was quite astute for these
arguments to be made, and Barrow & Burns did not hesitate to “wing it” and
make them.
Barrow & Burns also took a very pragmatic and political, as opposed to
legalistic, approach to settlement. Had a judge or a jury decided the case, the
family would have been limited to the recovery of monetary damages because
the claims only involved personal injury.78 Instead of feeling confined by these
limitations, Barrow & Burns asked for, and received in settlement, concessions
that a court of law would not have been able to award, such as a statue for the
workers and a scholarship fund, in addition to monetary compensation for their
clients. The lead lawyer in the Chavez case, in contrast, took a highly legalistic
approach to the case. In the lawyer’s words, it simply “never occurred” to him
to litigate the case in any other way.79 Because of this, he did not reach out to
activists, even though he was politically attuned to the broader political
dimension of the case.

78. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 377 (2000) (noting that in personal-injury cases,
“the normal remedy is compensatory damages”).
79. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiffs, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 22, 2000).
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There is no evidence, however, that “ordinary” lawyers are more committed
to the cause than mega-lawyers. On the contrary, there is some evidence that
the lawyers for the Espinoza family were less committed than the lawyers at
Allen & Adams. The lead lawyer for the Chavez workers is still handling
lawsuits on behalf of foreign workers. Barrow & Burns, in contrast, has not
handled any foreign workers’ cases since Espinoza and expresses relative
indifference about accepting such cases in the future.80
IV
CONCLUSION
These case studies suggest that the making of a great cause lawyer depends,
in part, on practice style. Put differently, how a lawyer approaches legal practice
seems to matter for purposes of legal mobilization. In these cases, cause lawyers
were more effective at using the law to advance a political agenda when they
adopted a more flexible practice style that may more closely resemble that of an
“ordinary” lawyer.
Perhaps more important, as Galanter predicted, the mega-lawyering
strategies of the Chavez lawyers ultimately conveyed a message of despair:
although the workers won an important legal ruling, the victory was overturned
by a state legislature, and many view the case as a failed opportunity to advance
the broader cause of workers’ rights. Espinoza, on the other hand, nourishes
our fondest hopes about the possibilities for legal mobilization. It was, as Burns
described it, “the kind of case that [he] had gone to law school for.”81
That “ordinary” lawyering could rejuvenate our faith in the law seems
almost counter-intuitive. But this hypothesis would also seem to be at the heart
of a legal movement spearheaded by trial lawyer Gerry Spence (whose fame
grew exponentially when he served as a television commentator during the O.J.
Simpson trial). In The Making of a Country Lawyer, Spence chronicles his
personal path, which culminated in the moment when he decided to stop
representing established interests and start representing individuals.82 For
Spence, this move was not simply about representing a different type of client; it
was also about adopting a different practice style.
Although Spence uses different language, the practice style of a “country
lawyer” has much in common with the “ordinary” practice style described by
Galanter. For Spence, winning a case is less about intensive research—
characteristic of mega-lawyering—and more about developing an emotional
connection with the client.83 Spence and the many lawyers who follow his

80. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998).
81. Id.
82. GERRY SPENCE, THE MAKING OF A COUNTRY LAWYER (1996).
83. See Dana K. Cole, Psychodrama and the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding the Story, 21 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (describing Spence’s “psychodrama” technique, which permits intense
client identification); see also GERRY SPENCE, GIVE ME LIBERTY! FREEING OURSELVES IN THE
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principles84 believe that a return to “country” lawyering is as much about
reclaiming a lawyer’s role in advocating for justice as it is about winning cases.85
According to Spence, “the principal reason people hold lawyers in such
disdain” is that lawyers have failed to “hear” the “anguish of a people seeking
justice.”86 At his trial lawyer college, small-firm lawyers with very limited
resources learn to listen to their clients and, in doing so, to free themselves from
the limitations of their legal education and become true “warriors” for
“justice.”87
There was something of Spence’s philosophy in Barrow & Burns’s approach
to the Espinoza litigation. Although not all lawyers employing an “ordinary”
practice style embrace Spence’s techniques, Barrow & Burns’s relationship with
the Espinoza family suggested a very high degree of client identification. Both
Barrow & Burns exhibited a great deal of compassion for the Espinoza family
and their fate. As compared to the other lawyers, for example, Barrow & Burns
were more eager to share details about Espinoza’s life. Perhaps more telling, in
the course of the interviews that took place several years after the case’s
conclusion, both Barrow and Burns wiped away tears while discussing the case.88
From this perspective, the distinction that Galanter drew between megalawyering and “ordinary” lawyering reveals itself as much more than simply a
useful construct for understanding a rapidly changing profession; it is also a
window into how our faith in the law is also undergoing change, both within and
outside the profession.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 302–03 (1998) (criticizing formal legal education for teaching the “science”
of law, rather than the “experience” of law in human lives).
84. Spence teaches these principles in seminars that he offers around the country and at a college
for trial lawyers in Wyoming. See SPENCE, supra note 83, at 303–05.
85. See id. at 302, 305 (describing how the lawyers who attend his trial lawyers’ college become
“warriors” for “justice”).
86. Id. at 302–03.
87. Id. at 299–305.
88. Interview with Counsel for the Plaintiff, in El Paso, Tex. (Sept. 13, 1998).

